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Summary
It is no accident that the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was 
designed and promoted as a way to build on, not replace, the 
employer-sponsored health insurance that now covers most 
working-aged Americans. Avoiding displacement of privately 
financed employer-based coverage was key to achieving 
politically feasible financing for the ACA’s coverage subsidies 
for low-income households—which are available, through 
tax credits and Medicaid, only for insurance provided outside 
the workplace. 
Although most analyses, including those done by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), the Rand Corporation, 
the Urban Institute and others, have concluded that the 
law will leave employer-sponsored health insurance largely 
intact, questions about how the incentives of the law will 
actually play out remain very much alive. Some benefit 
consultants’ reports of employers’ greater-than-anticipated 
interest in dropping coverage1 have fueled claims that 
CBO and others seriously misjudged employers’ incentives 
and significantly underestimated subsidy costs under the 
ACA. Some prominent economists see the law’s incentives 
as likely to induce a wholesale shift away from employer-
sponsored coverage.2 Others foresee a more modest but still 
substantial shift as employers increase employees’ premium 
contributions, thereby encouraging low- and modest-wage 
workers to take advantage of publicly subsidized coverage.3 
In either case, these analysts raise the prospect of public 
subsidy costs that will be substantially higher than estimated. 
The key to the ACA’s actual impact on employer-sponsored 
insurance (ESI) will be whether most workers’ employers 
continue to see their employees as valuing employer-
provided health insurance over the alternative created by 
the ACA. And, under the terms of the ACA and the pressure 
of a competitive marketplace, our analysis shows they 
overwhelmingly will. 
The bottom line is that most workers’ firms will be 
dominated by workers who will receive better benefits and, 
through the tax system, better subsidies through employer-
provided coverage than through newly created insurance 
exchanges. The strength of employee preferences may 
be hard to read in the short term, and some employers 
may seek immediate financial gain in benefit reduction 
as markets adjust to new circumstances. But over time, 
coverage reductions inevitably would make the workers 
that employers most want to keep worse off, and if those 
workers sought employment elsewhere as a result then the 
firm would be worse off as well. It is therefore unlikely that 
large numbers of employers currently providing insurance 
coverage will change their decisions to offer it. 
Although projections of future behavior are inherently 
uncertain, the conclusion by CBO and other analysts that the 
ACA will leave employer-sponsored coverage intact rests on 
simulations of the complex interaction of multiple factors 
in shaping employees,’ and thereby employers’, coverage 
preferences over the long term. By clarifying these factors, 
analyzing the way that the ACA does or does not affect 
them and examining how their influence on employers 
can be best understood, this brief explains why we believe 
that most Americans will continue to rely on employers 
for health insurance coverage even after the major ACA 
provisions are implemented in 2014. 
Employers’ Interest  
In Providing Health 
Insurance Coverage
Beginning in the 1940s and growing 
over the next several decades, several 
factors converged to establish job-
based benefits as Americans’ primary 
route to health insurance protection. In 
brief, insurers learned that they could 
lower administrative costs and avoid 
“adverse selection” (the purchase of 
insurance only by people who thought 
they would get sick) by selling to large 
employers; labor unions took advantage 
of regulators’ determination that health 
insurance and other fringe benefits 
were subject to collective bargaining; 
wage freezes during World War II gave 
employers a powerful incentive to offer 
health insurance in order to attract 
workers in a tight labor market; and 
tax policy administratively and then 
legislatively exempted employer-paid 
premiums from employees’ taxable 
income, essentially subsidizing its costs.
These insurance market, labor market 
and tax incentives worked together to 
make workplace-based health insurance 
better and cheaper than the insurance 
that employees could obtain on their 
own. Employers seeking to attract and 
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Table 1. Percentage of Private Sector Establishments That Offer Health Insurance, 2000 and 2009,  
By Firm Size and Wage
Number of Employees
All Sizes <10 10–24 25–99 100–999 1,000+
All Firms
2000 59.3 39.6 69.3 84.5 95.0 99.2
2009 55.0 33.6 62.5 81.6 94.3 99.2
Percent Change -7.3 -15.2 -9.8 -3.4  -0.7  0.0
Firms With 50% or More Employees Low Wage
2000 42.5 25.4 46.3 73.5 94.2 96.4
2009 41.0 17.9 32.8 59.5 88.7 98.5
Percent Change -3.5 -29.5 -29.2 -19.0  -5.8  2.2
Firms With 50% or More Employees Low Wage
2000 64.7 50.2 83.4 92.4 96.9 99.4
2009 62.2 41.7 76.4 91.4 97.1 99.7
Percent Change -3.9 -16.9  -8.4  -1.1   0.2   0.3
Taken from: McMorrow S, Blumberg LJ and Buettgens M. The Effects of Health Reform on Small Businesses and Their Workers. Washington: Urban Institute, June 2011. 
Source: Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Center for Cost and Financing Studies. 2000 and 2009 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey—Insurance Component
retain workers therefore increasingly 
came to offer health insurance, and 
employer contributions to employees’ 
health insurance became an integral part 
of most workers’ compensation.
The dominance of employer-sponsored 
health insurance did not make it 
universal. Its availability reflected what 
employers in different circumstances 
with different demands for labor 
found necessary to attract an adequate 
workforce. Employers able to attract 
workers at low wages have always 
been less likely to offer coverage; low-
wage workers lack sufficient clout in 
the labor market to command better 
wages, let alone better benefits. The level 
of employers’ contributions and the 
benefits they offer have always reflected 
variations in health care costs. Small 
employers, which have had to pay the 
higher administrative costs per worker 
associated with providing insurance 
to small groups, and small and other 
employers of low-wage workers are less 
likely to offer--or are likely to offer less 
generous--benefits. In 2009, only four in 
ten firms with predominantly low-wage 
workers provided health insurance, 
compared with more than six in ten 
among firms dominated by better-paid 
workers (see Table 1). 
These variations reflect the economic 
reality, documented by labor economists, 
that workers bear the full cost of 
health insurance coverage on average 
and over time.4 For profit-maximizing 
employers in competitive labor markets, 
workers’ total compensation—the 
combination of wages and benefits 
they receive—reflects the value of the 
contribution workers make to the firm. 
There is a tradeoff between wages and 
benefits. Because health costs keep 
rising and wages can only go so low 
(given minimum wage requirements and 
workers’ basic needs), employers with 
predominantly low-wage workers are 
increasingly less likely to offer health 
insurance or are more likely to reduce 
the benefits they offer. As premiums 
increase, offering health insurance makes 
it harder to keep compensation equal 
to the workers’ value to the firm. This 
tradeoff explains the substantial declines 
in coverage offerings for small firms 
with low-wage workers over the past 
decade (Table 1). From 2000 to 2009, the 
likelihood of predominantly low-wage 
firms with fewer than 25 employees 
offering coverage fell almost 30 percent, 
while in higher-wage firms with fewer 
than 10 and with 10 to 24 workers, 
coverage fell 17 percent and 8 percent, 
respectively. 
Rising per capita health care costs relative 
to average productivity per worker will 
cause these trends to continue, but they 
have nothing to do with the ACA. In 
general, with or without the new law, 
employers will offer benefits to the extent 
that their employees value benefits, both 
in general and relative to wages and to 
the extent that acceptable wages plus 
benefits do not exceed what employees 
are worth to the firm.
Implications of the 
Affordable Care Act for 
Employer Decision-Making
The critical question, then, in assessing 
the ACA’s impact is how it will 
affect employers’ assessment of the 
compensation packages necessary to 
attract the workers they need. Taking 
this perspective immediately dispels 
a common misconception about the 
ACA’s impact: that the penalties the 
ACA imposes on employers with 50 
or more workers that do not provide 
affordable coverage5 will have the 
perverse effect of leading employers 
who already provide coverage to drop 
it. Because the penalty is less than the 
cost of health insurance, some skeptics 
have argued that a simple cost calculus 
will lead employers to drop coverage. 
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But that argument ignores the fact that 
employers have been offering coverage 
for decades, with no threat of a penalty 
for not doing so. They do it for good 
economic reasons—they are competing 
for labor—and these economic reasons 
will determine whether they continue to 
do so or change their behavior.
What matters most here is not the ACA’s 
penalties —though, as we will see, the 
penalties will be a factor in employer 
decisions. Rather, the ACA’s establishment 
of a subsidized alternative to workplace 
coverage may undo, for some employees, 
the relative financial attractiveness of 
employer-sponsored coverage. The ACA’s 
impact on ESI will depend on whether, 
given the alternatives the law creates 
for coverage outside the workplace, 
employers will still see offering coverage 
as essential to attracting and retaining 
the workforce they want.
The ACA’s combination of tax subsidies 
and a newly effective nongroup 
insurance market means that, for some 
workers, health insurance coverage 
becomes a better deal outside than 
inside the workplace. But the law, with 
some limited exceptions,6 does not allow 
workers who are offered employer-
sponsored coverage to take advantage 
of that deal. Some argue, therefore, that 
employers have an opportunity to make 
their employees better off and improve 
their company’s bottom line if they drop 
coverage, pay the penalty, and, increase 
employees’ wages as necessary to cover 
any increases they face in health care 
costs. The assumption that this win-win 
proposition (better-off workers at lower 
employer costs) applies to large numbers 
of large employers has led to claims that 
employers will drop coverage in droves. 
Witness the following from a 
Washington Post op-ed from Wisconsin 
Senator Ron Johnson and former CBO 
Director Douglas Holtz-Eakin:
There are many employers who 
would happily get out of the practice 
of providing health insurance, if they 
could do it without hurting their 
workers. Obamacare will encourage 
them to do so. In the current 
system, most employers are highly 
reluctant to drop health coverage 
for employees because they don’t 
want their workers to be financially 
exposed. But under Obamacare, 
instead of paying $15,000 for family 
coverage, an employer can choose to 
pay a $2000 fine, pay more in cash 
wages, make his employees eligible 
for a huge government subsidy and 
come out ahead. Confident that their 
employees are also gaining, millions 
of employers will follow this logic.
Tens of millions of workers will 
be given the opportunity to take 
advantage of those subsidies. It makes 
no sense that just a few million will 
wind up in exchanges…. If…all 
American employees wind up in the 
exchanges—which we believe is a 
goal of Obamacare—then the annual 
cost of the exchanges would increase 
by more than $800 billion.7
That some workers now benefiting from 
ESI would be better off in exchanges is 
a fact—as described below. But a leap 
from that fact to the conclusion that 
employers have a powerful incentive to 
drop coverage runs counter to standard 
economic theory. First, over time, a 
competitive labor market will not allow 
employers to save money by dropping 
employer-sponsored coverage. As 
explained above, employers pay workers 
a combination of wages and benefits 
at a level equal to the employee’s 
value to the firm. The market will keep 
compensation at that level, whether 
employers pay a worker’s value only in 
wages or in some combination of wages 
and benefits. If, in total, an employer 
compensates workers less than their 
value, that employer will lose those 
workers to competitors who offer them 
more. If, alternatively, an employer pays 
workers more than their value, the firm 
will lose money. That means, plain and 
simple, that in a competitive market, 
employers cannot “come out ahead” by 
dropping coverage and at the same time 
reducing compensation.
The challenge to this argument, 
of course, is that the marketplace 
is not “perfectly” competitive or, 
more narrowly, that it takes a while 
for competitive forces to play out. 
Employers that respond positively 
when asked about dropping health 
insurance may be focused on immediate 
opportunities for financial advantage and 
the understandable desire to simply pay 
wages, rather than hard-to-manage health 
insurance costs. It is clearly a challenge 
to constrain wages to offset ever-
increasing health insurance premiums. 
Some employers may therefore “miss 
the mark” in the short term—cutting 
benefits and underpaying some workers, 
in order to compensate others for the 
benefit loss, as the predictors of large-
scale dropping claim. But the market will 
ultimately eliminate any underpayment, 
force these employers to adjust and 
bring total compensation into line with 
workers’ value. 
In short the “win-win” proposition 
posited as inducing wholesale dropping 
ignores market realities. Over time, if 
benefits decrease, wages increase—
and the total cost to the employer will 
be the same—equal to the worker’s 
contribution to the firm’s revenues. What 
will ultimately drive benefits is therefore 
not savings to employers but whether 
the workers that employers most want 
to keep actually want them to continue 
providing benefits. 
Given the way the ACA works, it is highly 
likely that they will, posing the second 
significant challenge to the rampant 
dropping argument. Under the ACA, 
only some workers—the lower-paid, 
lower-skilled workers—will benefit 
from the ACA’s exchange subsidies. 
Most employers hire a mix of workers 
who face different circumstances and 
have different preferences (e.g., some 
high income, some low income, some 
healthy, some not, some with families, 
some single). But a decision not to offer 
coverage affects all workers at the same 
time. Not all workers will be pleased 
with any one decision, and evidence 
suggests that the preferences of workers 
that are the most difficult to replace 
(e.g., highly skilled, often higher earners) 
will tend to carry the most weight 
in employer decision-making.8 These 
workers do not benefit from exchange 
subsidies and are likely to have a strong 
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preference that the employer continues 
to provide coverage. 
Analysts who predict widespread 
dropping argue that employers can 
compensate these workers for the loss 
of benefits. In so doing, however, they 
ignore the way markets adjust over time. 
Even if an employer drops coverage, 
the market will constrain workers’ total 
compensation to the value they bring 
to the firm. In a competitive market, 
any workers not paid in full will be 
lost to competing firms. That means 
that employers have no way to make 
money on workers who are happy 
with the change and use the savings 
to compensate those who are not. The 
competitive labor market requires them 
to pay wages to offset benefit reductions 
even for workers made better off by 
dropping. If they compensate workers 
made worse off, they will increase their 
total compensation costs. Dropping 
health insurance in that context will 
therefore lead to increased costs, not 
savings, to the firm.
The Costs and Benefits of 
Employers’ Decisions to 
Drop Coverage: Who Wins 
and Who Loses? 
Predictions of rampant dropping not 
only ignore fundamental challenges 
to employers’ ability to balance the 
interests of winners and losers, they also 
ignore fundamentals that will determine 
who winners and losers actually are. A 
look at new subsidies under the ACA, 
continuing tax subsidies under current 
law, and the characteristics of workers 
reveals the following points:
In general, better-paid workers 
remain better off with employer-
sponsored coverage. The 
attractiveness of the exchange relative 
to employer-sponsored coverage rests 
on the availability of equally or better-
subsidized coverage for equivalent 
benefits. Employees purchasing coverage 
in the exchange lose the tax benefits 
associated with work-based premiums 
and will have to pay premiums with 
after-tax dollars. ESI premiums are 
excluded both from federal and state 
income taxes and from payroll taxes—
those who foresee widespread dropping 
tend to ignore the payroll tax and state 
income tax advantages.9 Employees  
who drop ESI will need equivalent or 
greater subsidies in the exchange to 
offset this loss. 
The ACA subsidies—tax credits that 
limit premium expenses as a share 
of income—are available to people 
in families with incomes from 138 
percent10 to 400 percent of the federal 
poverty level ($30,843 to $89,400 for 
a family of four in 2011). Maximum 
premiums range from 3 percent of 
income for families with incomes at 138 
percent of the poverty level to 9 percent 
for families with incomes at or above 
three times that level.11 Exchange-based 
subsidies decrease as income increases, 
but the opposite is true for tax subsidies 
for employer benefits, which increase as 
income increases. 
In general, if an employer drops 
coverage, better-paid workers will be 
worse off. Even if they receive higher 
cash wages to offset the loss, they 
will face taxes on these wages which, 
keeping overall compensation at the 
level of their value to the firm, will not 
be offset. Exchange benefits will also 
be unattractive, relative to employer-
provided benefits, for better-off earners. 
Exchange-based subsidies are limited to 
plans with an actuarial value no greater 
than 70 percent, a value much lower 
than provided by the typical ESI plan (85 
percent).12 Although lower-wage workers 
can receive cost-sharing subsidies to 
enhance this value, subsidies decline 
with income. Subsidies leave out-of-
pocket burdens significantly higher than 
in typical employer-sponsored coverage 
for families with incomes between 201 
percent and 250 percent of the federal 
poverty level and phase out completely 
for families whose incomes exceed 250 
percent of that level.13
Regardless of their perspective on 
dropping, analysts agree that it is only 
at or below an income of 250 percent 
of the federal poverty level that the 
ACA’s combination of premium tax and 
cost-sharing subsidies makes exchange 
coverage, on average, as good as or better 
than tax-subsidized employer-sponsored 
coverage.14 Nondiscrimination rules 
impede employers’ ability to simply 
decide not to offer coverage to workers 
who have access to subsidies in the 
exchange while offering it to workers 
who do not. To deny coverage for those 
eligible for subsidies, they would have 
to drop it for everybody and therefore 
face a penalty—$2,000 per full-time 
employee—applied across all but the 
first 30 workers in firms with more 
than 50 workers (not just to those who 
participate in the exchange). 
In addition to paying the penalty, keeping 
all workers “whole” would require that 
employers pay additional wages both to 
cover extra unsubsidized premium and 
benefit costs (for workers eligible and 
ineligible for subsidies) and to offset 
the fact that any premium payments 
would now be paid by employees out 
of after-tax, not pre-tax, dollars. But, as 
explained above, employers would not 
be able simply to “pocket” savings from 
having the government subsidize their 
workers’ health care. They would have 
to pay subsidized workers their value 
in wages, along with any extra benefit 
costs, and would have to do the same 
for unsubsidized workers—and also 
would have to pay penalties. The result 
would be an overall increase in the firm’s 
compensation costs, which would make 
firms worse, not better, off.
Within firms, “losers” from 
dropping far out-number “winners,” 
on average. Taking all this together, 
employers would only be likely to drop 
coverage if most of their workers would 
benefit from the exchange—in which 
case they could substitute extra wages 
for benefit reductions. But, because 
offsetting payments would increase 
their compensation costs, employers 
are not likely to drop coverage if most 
of their workers would not benefit from 
the exchange. Claims of widespread 
dropping focus on the overall number 
of wage earners who would “win,” rather 
than on their distribution within firms. 
But when an employer contemplates 
a decision to drop coverage, it is the 
distribution of income among the firm’s 
employees that matters. 
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Thinking about a firm’s specifics, an 
employer whose firm is dominated by 
workers earning less than 250 percent of 
the federal poverty level would be highly 
likely to drop coverage. Most of the firm’s 
workers would benefit from subsidies 
in the exchange, and the employer 
could replace benefits with wages (less 
penalties)—to keep compensation equal 
to the worker’s value and thereby keep 
the worker—without increasing total 
compensation. At the other end of the 
spectrum, a firm dominated by workers 
earning incomes well above 250 percent 
of the federal poverty level would not 
be likely to drop coverage, since most of 
its workers would not receive subsidies 
in the exchange and increasing their 
wages to offset lost tax benefits and 
extra benefit costs (along with penalties) 
would mean paying workers “too much” 
relative to their worth, increasing rather 
than decreasing the firm’s total costs. 
Data on the distribution of worker 
incomes within firms are notoriously 
difficult to come by. Employer surveys 
can collect data only on wages, not 
incomes (since employers do not have 
information about households, only 
what they pay their own workers). 
Household surveys can collect data only 
on the particular sampled households, 
not the other workers with whom any 
given household members might work. 
However, we do know that only about 
one in five workers with their own ESI 
coverage has income below 250 percent 
of the federal poverty level (see Table 
2). Given this distribution, the share 
of workers who would benefit from 
dropping—based on income and subsidy 
calculations alone—will likely be far 
smaller than the share of workers who 
will not. If the firm dropped coverage, 
compensating all workers for lost 
benefits would increase employers’ total 
compensation costs. These employers, 
therefore, will have a disincentive to 
drop coverage. 
Complexities in assessing “winners” 
and “losers,” increase reluctance to 
drop. Further reducing the likelihood 
that employers will drop coverage is 
the difficulty in a mixed-wage firm 
of assessing predominant coverage 
preferences among employees. Where 
there are few high-wage workers and a 
lot of low-wage workers, or the opposite, 
predominant preferences may be 
relatively clear. But where there is a mix, 
which is most often the case, assessing 
preferences will be complicated by 
workers’ particular circumstances—
factors not taken into account by 
those who claim that dropping will be 
widespread. Factors that make dropping 
particularly unattractive to workers 
include the following:
•	Age—Because the ACA allows insurers 
in the exchange to charge higher rates 
to older workers (albeit to a more 
limited extent than occurs in today’s 
nongroup market), these workers 
or their family members would be 
particularly averse to an employer 
decision to drop coverage. Higher-
income workers tend to be older than 
lower-income workers. In large firms, 
half of workers with incomes above 
250 percent of the federal poverty level 
are between the ages of 45 and 64.15 
•	 Smoking—The ACA also allows 
insurers in the exchange to 
charge higher but still constrained 
premiums to smokers. Smokers are 
disproportionately represented among 
low-wage workers,16 whose subsidies 
will not be increased to reflect the 
higher premium cost. As a result, 
low-wage workers who smoke might 
actually be averse to having their 
employer drop coverage. 
•	 Family status—Although, in general, 
the ACA subsidies make exchange 
coverage relatively attractive to low-
wage workers, family circumstances 
may actually make exchange coverage 
unattractive. For example, a low-
wage worker with income from an 
employed spouse may not be eligible 
for subsidies in the exchange. Each 
family’s preference will reflect its own 
set of health insurance options and 
their respective values. Families will 
face different options and will value 
them differently based on their own 
health characteristics, willingness to 
take on risk, preferences for particular 
benefits and the relative prices of the 
choices before them. 
Family preferences will be further 
influenced by the uncertainties about 
newly established coverage mechanisms. 
Employees may be reluctant to lose 
access to an employer’s assistance in 
assuring access to benefits under a plan. 
Or, even more important, employees 
may be reluctant to replace benefits 
Table 2: Workers in Offering Firms with Own ESI Coverage
Firm Size Group Worker's Income N % Within Firm  Size Group
% With Single  
Policy
% Within Age 
 45 - 54
% Within Age  
55 - 64
100 or Fewer Employees
Under 250% FPL 4,918,974 26.98% 65.33% 20.39% 11.47%
Over 250% FPL 13,312,462 73.02% 66.89% 28.37% 20.70%
101 - 1000 Employees
Under 250% FPL 3,368,409 19.59% 62.83% 20.76% 12.42%
Over 250% FPL 13,829,047 80.41% 62.25% 29.52% 18.48%
Over 1000 Employees
Under 250% FPL 7,404,683 19.20% 65.99% 20.96% 10.88%
Over 250% FPL 31,163,249 80.80% 60.36% 30.10% 20.22%
All Firm Sizes
Under 250% FPL 15,692,066 21.21% 65.10% 20.74% 11.40%
Over 250% FPL 58,304,758 78.79% 62.30% 29.56% 19.92%
Taken from: Garrett B and Buettgens M. Employer-Sponsored Insurance under Health Reform: Reports of Its Demise Are Premature. Washington: Urban Institute, January 2011.
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subject to terms of employment with a 
public subsidy subject to “reconciliation” 
at the year’s end. The ACA requirement 
that an employee whose family income 
changes over the year pay back the value 
of tax credits deemed “excessive” may 
significantly reduce the attractiveness, 
relative to ESI, of even a seemingly 
valuable credit.
Given the complexity of employees’ 
preferences, which an employer 
would be hard-pressed to assess or to 
synthesize, a decision to drop coverage 
exposes an employer to the risk of 
undermining worker loyalty, increasing 
worker turnover and disrupting rather 
than enhancing employees’ benefit 
expectations. Deciding whether and 
when to take that risk is far more 
complicated—and less likely—than a 
simple subsidy calculus might suggest
Encouraging “winners” to drop 
voluntarily, rather than dropping 
coverage overall, cannot overcome 
these barriers to dropping. Some 
analysts have identified a potentially 
less risky alternative strategy to 
accommodate the interests of low-
wage workers with less disruption to 
higher-wage workers.17 This strategy 
would have employers continue to offer 
coverage but reduce the employer’s 
contribution to premiums so that the 
low-wage employee’s share exceeds 9.5 
percent of income—the point at which 
the ACA allows employees to receive 
subsidies in the exchange, even if their 
employers actually offer coverage. In 
these circumstances, employers would 
still face penalties but potentially smaller 
ones—the lesser of $3,000 per worker 
receiving a subsidy or $2,000 per 
full-time employee. And, these analysts 
argue, the costs of compensatory wage 
increases for workers who continue to 
prefer employer-sponsored coverage 
would be less than if the employer 
had dropped coverage—limited to the 
amounts necessary to offset higher 
employee contributions for those staying 
in the firm’s plans.
This idea posits a limited “win-win” 
proposition, but it suffers from the 
same logical and operational fallacies 
as the full-scale dropping argument and 
would pose some additional problems 
for an employer who tried it. First, 
and probably foremost, this strategy 
incorrectly assumes that the employer 
can actually save money on the 
employees who switch to the exchange. 
In fact, a competitive market will force 
them to increase wages for these 
employees; if they do not, they will lose 
workers to a competitor who will. Over 
time, employers cannot pay workers less 
than they are worth. 
Second, there will be no “extra” money  
to pay the penalties the firm will 
incur for all the workers who use 
the exchange.18 Firms that make the 
necessary wage adjustments to keep 
workers plus paying penalties would 
be increasing their total spending, not 
reducing it as proponents suggest. 
There is also a third problem. Analysts 
who have explored this strategy, 
like analysts who foresee large-scale 
dropping, fail to account for workers’ 
particular circumstances like age, 
smoking habits and family status. Lower-
paid workers likely to benefit from the 
exchange are also likely to be younger 
workers. If they voluntarily drop ESI 
coverage and go into the exchange, the 
employer will remain responsible for the 
older (and, more important, sicker and 
costlier) workers, without the ability to 
spread those costs across all workers’ 
wages. For the employer to avoid an 
increase in total compensation, that 
means higher premium contributions 
and lower wages for those who stay—
likely for the very workers the employer 
most wants to keep. The result is similar 
if nonsmokers leave and smokers stay, or 
if single workers leave and families stay. 
Again, the employer retains the more 
costly population and either increases 
total compensation or raises everyone’s 
premium contributions to cover the 
higher costs per insured. This is a losing 
proposition for employers, even though 
some employees will indeed be better 
off. Just like dropping, it is a strategy that 
most employers are unlikely to pursue. 
Predicting the Future  
of Employer-Sponsored 
Insurance
On its face, the idea that the ACA offers 
employers a “win-win” proposition—
making their workers better off and, 
at the same time, improving the firm’s 
bottom line—seems awfully attractive. 
But whether it comes to an employer’s 
decision to drop coverage or, more 
modestly, to increase employees’ 
contributions to encourage low-wage 
workers to drop coverage on their 
own, in a competitive marketplace the 
“win-win” ultimately does not exist. The 
grain of truth to the “win-win” argument 
lies in the space between “ultimately” 
and now. In the short term, as markets 
adjust, some employers may seek a 
financial advantage that they cannot 
sustain over time—escaping the burden 
of providing health benefits and, at 
the same time, reducing their overall 
Table 3: Changes in ESI Coverage Due to the ACA
Without Reform   ACA % Diff
Total ESI
Persons covered 151.6 151.2 -0.3%
ESI Policyholders and Coverage (in millions)
Single policyholders 44.4 46.5 4.9%
 Family policyholders 27.5 27.5 -0.2%
Persons covered 127.9 129.5 1.2%
Coverage Where No Policyholder is Identifiable1 (in millions)
Persons covered 23.7 21.7 -8.5%
Taken from: Garrett B and Buettgens M. Employer-Sponsored Insurance under Health Reform: Reports of Its Demise Are Premature. Washington:  
Urban Institute, January 2011. 
Source: Urban Institute analysis, HIPSM 2010.
1Persons in the CPS reporting ESI coverage when no policyholder is present in the household.
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compensation costs. Even in the short 
term, that strategy poses the risk of 
misjudging their employees’ preferences 
and competitive pressures, causing them 
to lose employees to competitors that 
are less willing to take a chance. And, as 
competition plays out, the inability to 
hire and keep the types of workers they 
most want will lead them to readjust 
their coverage and compensation 
accordingly. Markets will adjust, and 
it will be employees’ preferences, not 
employers’ financial gain, that determine 
the future of ESI. 
The future is uncertain, in large part 
because it is difficult for employers to 
predict the detailed and complex view of 
employees’ options, coverage valuations 
and resulting preferences that underlie 
the decisions that employers ultimately 
make. The best microsimulation 
models approximate these detailed and 
complex views, which then allow family 
preference computations, which in 
turn allow the simulation of employer 
decisions based on worker preferences 
as the marketplace unfolds. Using these 
models, the Urban Institute, CBO and 
others have concluded that overall 
employer-sponsored coverage under the 
ACA would not differ significantly from 
what coverage would be without it. Table 
3 shows this effect, as simulated using 
the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance 
Policy Simulation Model (HIPSM).
Confidence in this prediction 
is increased by experience in 
Massachusetts, whose 2006 health 
reform legislation adopted changes 
to the landscape of employee and 
employer choices quite similar to the 
ACA’s. In Massachusetts, the rate of 
employer-sponsored coverage increased 
about 3 percent from fall 2006 to 
fall 2009, a period covering both the 
implementation of the state reforms 
and a sizable increase in the state 
unemployment rate.19 
Although no prediction is certain, the 
most thorough analysis, validated by 
Massachusetts’ real-world test, supports 
the conclusion that the ACA, as intended, 
leaves employer-coverage intact, even as 
it creates a viable insurance market for 
people who ESI fails to reach. 
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